







We derive an econometric disequilibrium model for time series data. This is done by
error correcting the supply of some good. The model naturally separates between a
continuously clearing market and a clearing market in the long-run such that we are
able to obtain a novel test of clearing markets. We apply the model to the Swedish
market for short-term business loans, and ﬁnd that this market is characterized by a
long-run non-market clearing equilibrium.
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JEL classiﬁcation: C12, C13, C51, D53, E431 Introduction
In economics, the concept of a clearing market is essential. As economists, we build theo-
retical models around this concept as well as draw inference from our empirical research
while assuming that the supply of the studied good equals its demand; but seldom, if
ever, do we explicitly test for this hypothesis. Of course, the idea that some markets may
not clear is not new in economics. Previous literature refers to such markets as markets in
"disequilibrium" and, consequentially, previous attempts have been made to derive tests
for the clearing market hypothesis. Indeed, the literature on disequilibrium econometrics
is vast, see Fair and Jaffee (1972), Amemiya (1974), Maddala and Nelson (1974), Goldfelfd
and Quandt (1975), Quandt (1978), Bowden (1978), Gourieroux et al. (1980a), Gourieroux
et al. (1980b), Maddala (1986) among others. However, in spite of this large bulk of litera-
ture on the matter, relatively few empirical papers utilize the disequilibrium framework.
In part, this may be due to the fact that estimation under disequilibrium speciﬁcations is
considered complex and difﬁcult (Srivastava and Rao, 1990). Another cause may be the
discovery of spurious regression due to non-stationarity, as ﬁrst made explicit by Granger
and Newbold (1974) in their famous Monte Carlo study. Since many disequilibrium mod-
els rely heavily on time series data, spurious regressions may lead to false inference. Com-
bining this insight with the importance of prior analysis of time series data as discussed
by Granger (1981), and the discovery of methods that deal with the problems caused by
non-stationary data, such as the Error Corrected Model (ECM) (Engle and Granger, 1987);
it is easy to understand the current relative standstill in the disequilibrium econometrics
literature.
Inference made on estimates from ECMs is based on the assumption of a long-run
equilibrium. Notably, this equilibrium may be different from the market clearing equilib-
rium and it is more generally viewed as a steady state. Clearly, a steady state does not nec-
essarily imply a clearing market. It is likely that many markets (e.g., the credit and labour
markets) have excess demand (supply) in the long-run equilibrium, clearly violating the
clearing market hypothesis. Thus, we acknowledge the need to separate the equilibrium
concept from the concept of a clearing market. They need not be the same. Further, we
acknowledge that the price mechanism in some markets may be ﬂexible enough to equate
supply and demand in every instant (continuously) while some markets may suffer from
sticky prices, even though the market clears in the long-run. Armed with this insight, we
split the clearing market hypothesis in two parts and provide the reader with the follow-
ing two deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 1 The continuously clearing market hypothesis: Prices are ﬂexible enough to equate
supply and demand in every time period, i.e. Dt = St,∀t.
1Deﬁnition 2 The long-run clearing market hypothesis: The market mechanisms work in the di-
rection of a clearing market, i.e. supply equates demand in the long-run.
Examining the deﬁnitions above, clearly the long-run clearing market hypothesis is nec-
essary but insufﬁcient for the continuously clearing market hypothesis to hold true. As
such, there is a need to derive methods that can be used to test the hypotheses stated in
Deﬁnitions 1 and 2. Acknowledging this need, we derive a novel econometric model,
capable of tackling the disequilibrium concept while embracing the issues caused by non-
stationary data. The model naturally separates between a continuously clearing market
and a clearing market in the long-run such that we are able to derive a novel test of the
long-run clearing market hypothesis. We apply this test to the Swedish market for short-
term business loans and ﬁnd that this market suffers from a long-run non-market clearing
equilibrium. In addition, we ﬁnd results that indicate the occurrence of a supply side
driven credit crunch in the Swedish market for short-term business loans during 2009.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the general idea and
derives the disequilibrium model as well as a test for clearing markets. This is followed
by a section in which we apply the model to the Swedish market for short-term business
loans. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The General Idea
Let Dt and St denote the demand and supply of some good, respectively, and let Qt =
(Dt,St) be a bivariate quantity system of the latent quantities. It is reasonable to assume
that the system is co-integrated, i.e. the supply may not drift too far away from the de-
mand and vice versa. Thus, we relax the rather restrictive assumption of a continuously
clearing market and consider the case when Dt − St ∼ I(0). Using this, while acknowl-
edging the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987), we write a simple
Error Corrected Model (ECM) for the supply function as:1
 St = ψ0 + ψ1(St−1 − Dt−1) + γ St−1 + λ Dt + ǫt, (1)
where E[ǫt] = 0. This model is related to the structural ECM by the inclusion of  Dt
(Engle and Yoo, 1991) and if we examine the ECM above, while recalling that the continu-
ously clearing market hypothesis requires Dt = St,∀t; we acknowledge that continuously
clearing markets, by deﬁnition, are liberated from occasional non-market clearing quanti-
ties. Since ψ1 is the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, a necessary condition
1Obviously, the arguments stated in this section also apply on the demand side of the market.
2for a continuously clearing market is that ψ1 = 0. In addition, the ECM in (1) implies that:
0 = ψ0 + ψ1(S∗ − D∗),
which we can rearrange to the long-run equilibrium:




Hence, the difference between the long-run clearing market and the actual long-run equi-
librium is represented by the ratio ψ0/ψ1. If this ratio is non-zero, the long-run clearing
market hypothesis in Deﬁnition 2 can be falsiﬁed. We also note that any test of the long-
run clearing market hypothesis requires ψ1  = 0 due to the intangible nature of the two
hypotheses.
Given the latent nature of Qt, it is unlikely that we are able to measure the supply and
demand of a good per se. If we are to test for the hypotheses in Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, we
need to derive some measurable implications. Thus, we give functional forms to the de-
mand and supply functions. In many cases economic theory may be of use. Just as often,
the researcher may not know the appropriate functional form. Here, we consider the case
when the demand and supply functions are linear in prices:
Dt = αC + αPPt + αXXt + ut (3)
St = βC + βPPt + βZZt + vt, (4)
where Xt and Zt are exogenous variables on the demand and supply side, respectively, Pt
isthepriceofthegoodwhile ut and vt arerandomerrorswithzeromeans. Ifwesubstitute
(3) and (4) into (1) we can rearrange (1) into a reduced form equation of the difference in
prices:
 Pt = θ × [ψ0 + ψ1 (βC − αC) + ψ1 (βP − αP) Pt−1 + ψ1βZZt−1 (5)
− ψ1αXXt−1 + γβP Pt−1 − βZ Zt + γβZ Zt−1 + λαX Xt
+ ψ1 (vt−1 − ut−1) − vt + γ vt−1 + λ ut + ǫt],
where θ = (βP − λαP)
−1. For convenience we rewrite (5) as:
 Pt = η0 + η1Pt−1 + µ1Zt−1 + µ2Xt−1 + µ3 Pt−1 (6)
+ µ4 Zt + µ5 Zt−1 + µ6 Xt + ξt,
where E[ξt] = 0, given the assumptions made on the error terms. Since the model in (6) is
derived from the ECM in (1), we call this model the error corrected disequilibrium model.
3In (6) we have an easy way of estimating the combined parameters. Unfortunately,
all underlying parameters in (5) can not be uniquely recovered form the parameters of
(6). In addition, the error term is serially correlated, i.e. Cov[ξt,ξt−1]  = 0; a notable issue
that needs to be tested for and dealt with in order for the parameters in (6) to be esti-
mated consistently and efﬁciently. For now, however, the ability to estimate the combined
parameters is enough and we proceed by deriving the implied long-run equilibrium (sta-
tionary) price from the error corrected disequilibrium model in (6):
P∗ = η−1
1 (−η0 − µ1Z∗ − µ2X∗). (7)
Thus, by estimating the combined parameters in (6) we can estimate the implied long-run
affects in (7). We call this model the equilibrium price model. In addition, if we substitute
for the underlying parameters of (5) in (7) while acknowledging that a clearing market
in the long-run requires ψ0/ψ1 = 0; we can write the difference between the long-run
equilibrium price (P∗) and the long-run clearing market price (PC) as:





The above clearly highlights the importance of the price elasticity in markets subject to
some long-run non-market clearing equilibrium. If the market participants are inﬁnitely
elastic, the long-run price difference in (8) is effectively nulliﬁed. In addition, the price
difference in (8) also shows that the equilibrium price in (7) does not necessarily reﬂect the
clearing market price. Thus, we acknowledge the need for a test of the long-run clearing
market hypothesis if we seek to draw inference from the estimates in (7).
The long-run clearing market hypotheses requires ψ0/ψ1 = 0. If we are to test for this
hypothesis, we need some measurable implication of this ratio. Since a clearing market
in the long-run is a necessary condition for the continuously clearing market hypothesis,
such a test would jointly test the two hypotheses. As it turns out, a simple statistical
test on η1 in (6) will sufﬁce. In other words, if η1  = 0 it follows that ψ0/ψ1  = 0 such
that we may reject the long-run clearing market hypothesis as well as the continuously
clearing market hypothesis. This result holds true regardless of the lag structure in (1) or
if we include additional explanatory variables in (3) and (4). The arguments underlying
these claims are presented at length in the Appendix. In addition, we acknowledge that
such a test is based on the estimated lagged price affect on the difference in prices. Thus,
the observant reader may have noticed the resemblance between the test of the long-run
clearing market hypothesis and an augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root with drift.
Indeed, η1 ∈ [−1,0] is required in order for the price series to be stationary.
43 An Empirical Application
We apply the error corrected disequilibrium model derived in the previous section to the
Swedish credit market. More speciﬁcally, we test for the long-run clearing market hy-
pothesis on the market for commercial bank loans in Sweden and estimate the implied
effects on the equilibrium rate. We restrict the pool of borrowers to Swedish non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms. Since lenders may limit the supply of loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), credit mar-
kets may suffer from some long-run non-market clearing equilibrium. Thus, the credit
market is an ideal trial candidate. Indeed, some recent related studies do in fact embrace
the disequilibrium framework in studies of credit markets (Pazarbasioglu (1996), Perez
(1998), Hurlin and Kierzenkowski (2003), Allain and Oulidi (2009) among others); even
though the spurious regression problem caused by non-stationary data is widely ignored.
Despite this we ﬁnd it fruitful to borrow from previous research when selecting suitable
determinants of the demand and supply for commercial bank loans. In particular, we are
inspired by an early paper by Laffont and Garcia (1977), adjusting their suggested de-
mand and supply functions to the Swedish credit market conditions.
The real demand and real supply of commercial bank loans are likely to share the
interest rate, r, as a common determinant. Acknowledging that interest rates vary with
maturity, we choose to study short-term debt such that r represents an interest rate on the
short end of the yield curve. In order to incorporate the effects on real demand related to
alternative funding schemes (e.g., commercial papers or long-term debt) we also choose
to include an alternative funding rate, ralt, as a determinant of the real demand. By do-
ing so we control for potential substitution effects. In addition, it is likely that the real
demand for commercial bank loans is strongly associated with economic activity. Thus,
we include the industrial production index as our proxy for current economic activity,
Ind. We acknowledge that an increase in prices may effect ﬁrm proﬁts as well as the price
of input factors used in banking and include inﬂation, Infl, as a common determinant
of the real demand and the real supply for commercial bank loans. Continuing with the
real supply, we include the real value of bank deposits, Dep, as one of its determinants.
Since real supply is likely to be affected by regulatory rules, we also include the ratio be-
tween equity and invested capital, eic, as a proxy for capital requirements and state the
real demand and real supply for short-term business loans as:





a2,iIndt−i + ut (9)






b3,jInflt−j + vt, (10)
5where we have distributed lags of unspeciﬁed lengths and ut and vt are subject to the
usual assumptions.
Inspecting the speciﬁed demand and supply functions above, one may argue that the
the industry production index can be used as a proxy for ﬁrms’ ability to repay debt. By
this argument, the production index should be included as a determinant on the supply
side of short-term business loans. However, such an argument is of little concern. The
inclusion of demand speciﬁc variables on the supply side, or vice versa, does not alter the
reduced form of the error corrected disequilibrium model per se; only the implied form
of the µ parameters in the studied market’s equivalence of (6). Since we can not uniquely
solve for these parameters and since we primarily seek the equilibrium price effects while
testing for the long-run clearing market hypothesis, we safely ignore such issues.
We use aggregate monthly data from November 2005 to July 2011, collected from
Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank (Sweden’s central bank). We use the seasonally ad-
justed Swedish production index and let rt be the average interest rate on commercial
bank loans. Thus, the price variable is averaged out over the yield curve. However, over
88 percent of all Swedish business loans provided to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms mature within
one year after issue. Thus, it is unlikely that the averaging out effect has a signiﬁcant
impact on rt. As regards the cost of alternative funding, we acknowledge that maturities
on commercial paper are ﬂexible and ﬁxed by the issuer at the time of issue. Typically,
maturities will range from one day up to two years where 1-3 months are the most com-
mon maturities in Sweden. Following this line of argument, we let ralt
t be the average
3-month money market rate (3-month STIBOR).2 In addition, since the Riksbank lowered
the prime rate with historical proportions during the time period December 2008 to July
of 2009, we choose to include an indicator variable, It, for the year 2009.
Implementing the framework derived in the previous section while acknowledging
that Cov[ξt,ξt−s]  = 0, we estimate a variety of error corrected models, choosing the model
with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion value. Based on this method, the following
error corrected disequilibrium model is estimated:
∆rt = η0 + η1rt−1 + µ1Dept−1 + µ2eict−1 + µ3ralt
t−1 + µ4Inflt−1 (11)
+ µ5Indt−1 + µ6It + µ7∆ralt
t + µ8∆Inflt + µ9∆Indt
+ ζt + φ1ζt−1 + φ2ζt−2 + φ3ζt−3,
where {ζt} is a white noise error sequence. Due to the ﬁnancial turmoil of the recession of
2008-2009, we split the sample in two, estimating a pre and post recession model using the
2Since the 3-month STIBOR is likely to be highly correlated with the average interest rate on short-term
business loans, we check for the robustness of the results by replacing the 3-month STIBOR with a variety of
interest rates higher up on the yield curve.
6Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimates of the error corrected disequilibrium model ap-
plied to the Swedish market of short-term business loans. Conditional least squares esti-
mates are used as starting values.
Full sample Nov 2005 - Dec 2008 Jan 2009 - Jul 2011
Intercept 1.718∗∗∗ 0.607 1.235∗∗∗
rt−1 −0.536∗∗∗ −0.264∗ −0.562∗∗∗
Dept−1/106 −0.153∗∗∗ −0.105 −0.106∗∗∗
eict−1 7.486∗∗∗ 0.544 7.185∗∗∗
ralt
t−1 0.346∗∗∗ 0.162∗ 0.431∗∗∗
Inflt−1 0.055∗∗∗ 0.040∗ −0.008∗∗
Indt−1 −0.006∗∗ 0.002 −0.002∗∗∗
∆ralt
t 0.425∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
∆Inflt −0.010 −0.008 −0.036∗∗∗
∆Indt −0.014∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.009∗∗∗
It 0.086∗∗
ζt−1 −0.909∗∗∗ −1.158∗∗∗ −2.831∗∗∗
ζt−2 0.337∗ 0.532∗ 2.739∗∗∗
ζt−3 −0.428∗∗ −0.375∗ −0.905∗∗∗
N 69 38 31
Note: Signiﬁcance codes: 0.001 : "∗∗∗", 0.01 : "∗∗", 0.1 : "∗"
full sample model structure. Notably, exactly when the crises came to affect the market
for short-term business loans is hard to determine. However, it is likely that lending rates
are affected by the cost of funding. Thus, we use the lowering of the Riksbank’s prime
rate as an indicator, splitting the sample at 2009.
Examining the full sample estimates in Table 1, the intercept as well as the lagged
interest rate are clearly signiﬁcant; implying non-zero values on ψ0 and ψ1. Thus, we
reject the long-run clearing market hypothesis as well as the continuously clearing market
hypothesis. As banks may ration credit, this result implies that the Swedish market for
short-term business loans suffers from excess demand. This result is robust to the choice
of alternative funding rates and is virtually unaffected by the number of lags in (9), (10)
and(6). Inaddition, sincetheeffectofrt−1 remainssigniﬁcantregardlessofsampleperiod,
this result remains true even when the ﬁnancial turmoil of the recent recession is excluded
from the sample. The full sample model has a squared correlation between observed and
in-sample forecast level values of 0.88 suggesting a good ﬁt.
7Table 2: Implied estimates of the equilibrium price model applied to the Swedish market













Economic activity (Ind∗) −0.011∗∗
2009 effect (It) 0.161∗∗
Note: Signiﬁcance codes: 0.001 :"∗∗∗, 0.01 : "∗∗", 0.1 : "∗"
Based on the structure of the equilibrium price model in (7) and the estimated error





−η0 − µ1Dep∗ − µ2eic∗ − µ3ralt∗ − µ4Infl∗ − µ5Ind∗ − µ6It
$
.
The implied estimated equilibrium effects are presented in Table 2, where the signiﬁcance
tests are performed using the quotient determined standard errors by Fieller’s theorem
(Fieller, 1932). As can be seen, the sign of the estimated effects are largely in accordance
with what we may expect from economic theory. The interest rate becomes smaller with
"supply increasing" variables (Dep) and increases with quantity restrictions on the supply
side (eic). In addition, an increase in the 3-month STIBOR, i.e. an increase in the cost of
alternative funding (ralt) forces an increase in the equilibrium interest rate. This effect can
largely be traced back to the structure of yield curves and the covariance between interest
rates. In addition, we note that the equilibrium rate does not fully absorb increases in
inﬂation (Infl). A one percent increase in inﬂation implies a mere ten basis point increase
in the equilibrium rate. However, since this estimate is non-signiﬁcant, we do not dwell
on this matter any further.
There is one variable that at ﬁrst sight shows an unexpected impact. An increase in
economic activity (Ind) reduces the equilibrium interest rate. One rational for this may
be that an increase in economic activity increases the ability to repay debt. Possibly, this
shifts the supply curve to such an extent that its effect on the equilibrium interest rate
outweighs the effect caused by an increase in the demand for credit. Whatever its cause,



















Figure 1: Actual interest rate (solid line) and the estimated equilibrium rate (dashed line).
of credit. In addition, we ﬁnd an increase in the equilibrium interest rate, ceteris paribus,
during the historical lowering of the Riksbank’s prime rate during 2009. Since it is fairly
unlikely that the lowering of the prime rate coincided with an unexpected increase in the
demand for credit, this result implies an unexpected reduction in the supply of credit.
Thus, we have found some evidence in support of a supply side driven credit crunch dur-
ing 2009.
In Figure 1 we illustrate the equilibrium and actual interest rates for short-term busi-
ness loans in Sweden. As can be noted, the actual interest rate moves sluggishly behind
the equilibrium rate; possibly due to the stock variable of debt included due to the av-
eraging out over the yield curve. As such, when the interest rate dropped in 2009, there
was a huge temporary gap between the equilibrium and the actual average interest rate
on short-term debt. Recalling the estimated reduction in the supply of credit during 2009
in Table 2; we acknowledge that the supply side driven credit crunch hindered a further
drop of interest rates with, at least, 16 basis points.
4 Concluding Remarks
If we embrace the concept of co-integrated demand and supply of some good, there exists
an error corrected model that corrects for short-term ﬂuctuations around some long-run
9equilibrium supply (demand). Such a model implies a model in price differences, depen-
dent on lagged variables of the demand and supply functions. We call this model the error
corrected disequilibrium model from which we derive a model of the equilibrium price.
Since the error corrected disequilibrium model allows for long-run non-market clearing
equilibria, we derive a test of the long-run clearing market hypothesis and the continu-
ously clearing market hypothesis. As it turns out, a simple statistical test on the parameter
estimates from the error corrected disequilibrium model sufﬁces.
We use the error corrected disequilibrium model on the Swedish market for short-
term business loans and ﬁnd that this market suffers from a long-run non-market clearing
equilibrium. Acknowledging that banks may ration credit, this result indicates that the
Swedish market for short-term business loans suffers from excess demand for credit. In
addition, by including an indicator variable for the year 2009, we are able to capture an
unexpected supply shift. By this method, we ﬁnd evidence in support for a supply side
driven credit crunch during 2009.
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12Appendix: A Test of Clearing Markets
Consider a test of the long-run clearing market hypothesis of Deﬁnition 2. To derive a
test that is robust to functional form, we base it on the parameters η0 and η1 from the
error corrected disequilibrium model in (6). These parameters are conﬁned to the same
basic structure, regardless of the lag structure in (1) or if we include additional explana-
tory variables in (3) and (4).3 When deriving such a test, we ﬁrst consider the combined







If we assume that the price elasticity differs between the demand and supply side, i.e. that
αP  = βP, it follows from (A.1) that a non-zero value on η1 implies a non-zero value on ψ1.
Thus, if η1  = 0 we may reject the continuously clearing market hypothesis, as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 1.
Recallingthatthelong-runclearingmarkethypothesisofDeﬁnition2requires ψ0/ψ1 =
0, we acknowledge the need of deriving some measurable implication of this ratio. As it
turns out, a non-zero value on η1 implies a non-zero value of the ratio ψ0/ψ1. To see this,
we ﬁrst use the intercept in the error corrected disequilibrium model in (6):
η0 =
ψ0 + ψ1(βC − αC)
βP − λαP
. (A.2)
Now, consider the case when η0 = 0 and solve for ψ0 in (A.2):
ψ0 = ψ1(αC − βC). (A.3)
By inspection of the above we see that if η1  = 0 such that ψ1  = 0 when η0 = 0, the long-
run clearing market hypothesis only holds true when αC = βC. Clearly, such cases are
irrelevant. The same conclusion arrises if we let η0  = 0. To see this assume, for the sake







Solve for ψ1 in (A.1), recalling that we have assumed that the price elasticity differs be-







3Strictly speaking, the removal of ∆Dt in (1) reduces the denominators in (A.1) and (A.2) into βP.





which we substitute back to either (A.3) or (A.5) such that ψ1 = 0. Returning to (A.1), it
follows that η1 = 0 if ψ0 = 0 when η0 != 0. Thus, if η1 != 0 and η0 != 0 it follows that ψ0 is
non-zero such that we may reject the long-run clearing market hypothesis.
Giventheabove, asimplestatisticalteston η1 in(6)issufﬁcientfortestingthelong-run
clearing market hypothesis as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2. Since a clearing market in the long-
run is a necessary condition for the continuously clearing market hypothesis, as deﬁned
in Deﬁnition 1, such a test jointly tests the two hypotheses.
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